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 Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law 
 
James A. Sweeney* 
 
1. Introduction  
To be recognised as a refugee in the UK, an asylum seeker must prove „to a 
reasonable degree of likelihood‟ that they have a well founded fear of persecution for 
one of the reasons specified in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.
1
  Applicants will 
tend to have little in the way of documentary evidence, and a lot will depend on what 
they say and how they say it.  This is said to involve assessing their credibility. 
Credibility assessments are usually understood to involve checking for three 
things: internal consistency, external consistency (congruence with known facts), and 
plausibility.
2
  But this does not tell us how internally consistent, how externally 
consistent, or how plausible the applicant‟s story would need to be in order to be 
„credible‟.  Does an individual really need to „prove‟ credibility, and what is the 
extent of the relationship between credibility findings and the outcome of the case?       
                                                 
* James A. Sweeney LLB (ELS) (Hons.) PhD, Lecturer in Law, Durham Law School, Durham 
University.  The law is stated as at 16 September 2009.  Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers at 
IJRL for their comments on an earlier draft, and to the members of the SLS Migration Law stream who 
commented on an even earlier draft presented as a written paper at the 2008 SLS Annual Conference.    
1
 As amended by the 1967 Protocol; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 
1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (UN Refugee Convention); Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 
267; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Sivakumaran and others [1988] 1 AC 
958, [1987] UKHL 1, [1988] 1 All ER 193, [1988] Imm AR 147, [1988] 2 WLR 92.  This article 
concentrates on applications for recognition as a refugee, but the same issues of credibility, proof and 
fact handling skills arise equally when applicants assert that their removal from the UK would violate 
the European Convention on Human Rights or European Union law. 
2
 A. Weston „“A witness of truth” – credibility findings in asylum appeals‟ (1998) 12 Immigration and 
Nationality Law and Practice 87-89 at 88 is often credited with identifying these categories. 
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The UN Refugee Convention makes no mention of credibility either in 
relation to the refugee definition in Article 1A(2) or the prohibition on refoulement in 
Article 33(1), yet many applications for asylum in the UK are rejected specifically 
because there are doubts about the „credibility‟ of the application.3  The assessment of 
credibility has been described as „often the single most important step‟ in determining 
refugee status.
4
       
Despite its importance, the term „credibility‟ is used in several different ways 
in the UK and elsewhere, with a range of descriptive intentions and legal 
consequences.  It is „conceptually elusive and adjudicatively influential.‟5  The 
contribution of this article is to unpick the multiple significances of the term, in order 
to refine the legal significance of credibility assessments and their relationship to 
questions of proof.  
In response to some of the concerns expressed about the quality of asylum 
decision making in the UK, special advice on credibility in the form of an „Asylum 
Policy Instruction‟ (API) has been issued.6  The API gives some useful and welcome 
technical advice on how to make credibility findings, but it is deeply problematic on 
the threshold for „being credible‟ and on the legal significance of credibility findings 
upon the outcome of the application for asylum.   
                                                 
3
 G. Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (Oxford: OUP, 2
nd
 edn., 2006), 408.  
4
 M. Kagan, „Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status 
Determination‟ (2003) 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 367-415 at 367.   
5
 G. Coffey, „The Credibility of Credibility Evidence at the Refugee Review Tribunal‟ 15 IJRL 377-
417 (2003), 377; also on Australia see S. Norman, „Assessing the Credibility of Refugee Applicants: A 
Judicial Perspective‟ 19 IJRL 273-292 (2007).  
6
 API „Assessing Credibility in Asylum and Human 
Rights Claims‟ (2006, rebranded 2008), available at UK Border Agency, „Guidance and Instructions‟ 
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/> (Accessed 17 September 2009)  
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The following analysis will examine the API itself, the UK‟s primary 
legislation, Immigration Rules and case law, EU law, and guidance provided by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).  Part one 
introduces the UK‟s API and reviews the three common techniques for determining 
credibility.  Part two identifies the existence of divergent „broad‟ and „narrow‟ 
interpretations of the significance of credibility in the refugee status determination 
process.  The API is shown to overlook this distinction, conflating an understanding 
of credibility as loose shorthand for the strength of the case with a narrower 
understanding of credibility as an evidential issue.  Part three introduces some basic 
concepts from the law of evidence in order to elaborate on credibility as an evidential 
issue, in order to demonstrate that the threshold of „being credible‟ can be 
distinguished from „being proven‟.  Part four examines the UK‟s legal rules on giving 
the benefit of the doubt to credible statements, and criticises the extent to which 
„general credibility‟ issues unrelated to evidential admissibility, such as the 
promptness of the application for asylum, are allowed to impact upon credibility 
findings.  Part five returns to the standard of proof in asylum cases, and explains how 
credible but unproven statements may play an important role in satisfying it.  A close 
reading of the Karanakaran
7
 case is undertaken, which disputes the API‟s 
interpretation of its findings.  The conclusion recommends the deletion of the API on 
credibility, and proposes some succinct advice to decision makers in the UK and 
elsewhere on the significance and process of assessing credibility.    
 
1.1 ‘Credibility’ and the quality of asylum decision making in the UK 
                                                 
7
 Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11, [2000] Imm AR 
271, [2000] INLR 122, [2000] 3 All ER 449. 
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The quality of asylum decision making in the UK has been a cause for concern for 
some time,
8
 and since 2003 the UNHCR Quality Initiative Project has been assisting 
the UK government to improve its refugee status determination (RSD) process.  
Given the importance of credibility to the RSD process, concern over the quality of 
decision making in the UK has, inevitably, involved concern over decision makers‟ 
approach to credibility.   
The attitude of decision makers and the techniques used to discredit and 
disbelieve applicants‟ testimony has been especially problematic.  The UNHCR‟s 
second report produced under the Quality Initiative Project identified a need for 
further training of decision makers to counter the onset of a „refusal mindset‟.9  
Elsewhere decision makers have been described as possessing an „agenda of 
disbelief‟.10  Also in its second report, the UNCHR identified that a significant 
                                                 
8
 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, „Asylum Applications‟ HC (2003-04) 218-I; National 
Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, „Improving the Speed and Quality of 
Asylum Decisions‟ HC (2003-04) 535; E. Smith, Right First Time? Home Office Interviewing and 
Reasons for Refusal Letters (London: Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture 2004); 
see also the research compiled in Independent Asylum Commission, Fit for Purpose Yet? The 
Independent Asylum Commission‟s Interim Findings (London: IAC 2008).  The Government‟s 
responses to the IAC‟s interim findings are tracked through the subsequent reports, available at 
<http://www.independentasylumcommission.org.uk/> (accessed 30 July 2009).  The IAC is discussed 
further below in the text at fn. 15. 
9
 UNHCR, Quality Initiative Protect: Second Report to the Minister (UNHCR 2005), at 17.  Although 
initially confidential, all the reports and the UK Government‟s responses to them are now available at 
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/unhcrreports/> (accessed 
30 July 2009). 
10
 J. Ensor, A. Shah, M. Grillo „Simple myths and complex realities – seeking truth in the face of 
section 8‟ (2006) 20 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 95-111 at 95; the Independent Asylum 
Commission Interim Report n8 above at 2 & 20 also noted the observation of a „culture of disbelief‟ in 
decision makers.  
Page 5 of 42 
number of caseworkers, including those in senior positions, incorrectly interpret key 
refugee law concepts.
11
   
There have been several important developments in the way that asylum 
applications are decided since the UNHCR Quality Initiative Project began, and 
several areas of improvement have been identified.
12
  The biggest changes include the 
radical reorganisation of the government department that handles applications for 
asylum,
13
 and the implementation of the „New Asylum Model‟: a case management 
system announced in 2005 and characterised by the segmentation of claims according 
to priority and complexity, and the „ownership‟ of each application from end-to-end 
by a single case worker.
14
  Resulting improvements, although with several areas of 
continued concern, have been confirmed by the Independent Asylum Commission.
15
 In its fourth report on the Quality Initiative Project, the UNHCR observed that 
assessing credibility and establishing the facts of the case remained a „challenging 
                                                 
11
 UNHCR, Quality Initiative Protect: Second Report to the Minister, n. 9 above at 1& 11; the 
Government response (see n9 above) did not address this point directly, although it devotes 
considerable attention to training and monitoring.          
12
 See UNHCR, Quality Initiative Project: Fourth Report to the Minister (UNHCR 2007). 
13
 Applications for asylum are within the remit of the Home Office.  Within this, they were handled by 
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, which became the Border and Immigration Agency on 1 
April 2007.  Since 1 April 2008 they are handled by „UKBA‟ – the UK Border Agency which, whilst 
awaiting full agency status, describes itself as „a shadow agency‟ of the Home Office.  Details of the 
changes within the Home Office can be found at 
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/border_review.aspx> (accessed 16 September 2009).  
14
 Home Office „Controlling our Borders: Five year strategy for asylum and immigration‟ CM6472 
(2005) at 35 et seq; for the process itself see 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/process/processoverview/> (accessed 16 September 
2009). 
15
 The Commission is an NGO commissioned by the Citizen Organising Forum 
(<http://www.cof.org.uk>) to review the UK asylum process between October 2006 and July 2008.  
The third and final report was still particularly concerned about the caseload of NAM caseworkers: 
Independent Asylum Commission, Third Report of Conclusions and Recommendations: Deserving 
Dignity (London: IAC 2008), at 13. 
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area‟ for a significant number of decision makers.16  It detailed the development of a 
best practice guide on credibility.  This was to be used as the basis for a new API, a 
draft of which UNHCR noted it was pleased to have had the opportunity to comment 
upon.
17
  Thus, amongst the measures designed to improve both the quality and 
consistency of decision making, an API on credibility was issued by the Home Office 
in 2006.
18
     
There are some 43 APIs, arranged thematically, along with another 13 
„Asylum Policy Update‟ notices (APUs) explaining recent changes in the law and 
policy.  The APIs and APUs are influential but non-legislative documents designed to 
help decision makers by drawing together law and good practice.  The UK Border 
Agency website simply states that the APIs „are the Government‟s policy on asylum.  
They are followed by asylum case owners in the UK Border Agency‟ [emphasis 
added].
19
  The UK has rejected the UNHCR recommendation that case workers 
should be educated to university level.
20
  Thus the APIs must play a role in bridging 
                                                 
16
 UNHCR, Fourth Report to the Minister n. 12 above, at 2.  
17
 UNHCR, Fourth Report to the Minister n. 12 above, at 3. 
18
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above. 
19
 UK Border Agency, „Guidance and Instructions‟  
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/> (Accessed 16 September 2009). 
20
 UNHCR recommended that a university degree, „together with asylum specific competencies,‟ 
would be the desirable minimum educational qualification for asylum casework: UNHCR, Quality 
Initiative Project: First Report to the Minister (UNHCR 2005), 10, available at 
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/unhcrreports/> (accessed 
16 September 2009).  The Home Office responded by confirming a policy of requiring two „A‟ levels 
was in place for external candidates; that degree level qualification was „not necessary for external 
candidates provided a comprehensive and realistic competency or accreditation framework is adopted‟; 
and that specifying minimum qualifications for internal candidates „would not be in line with current 
Home Office policy, equality or diversity guidelines‟: Tony McNulty, „Minister‟s Response to First 
Report‟, 2, also available at 
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/reports/unhcrreports/> (accessed 
16 September 2009).  The minimum qualification to commence an undergraduate degree in law at 
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the gap between law and practice by making complex legal and conceptual issues 
accessible to decision makers.        
It might be observed initially that the array of thematic guidance provided by 
the APIs and APUs, which ranges from the general to the specific, from the 
procedural to the substantive, is not the clearest or most concise way of rendering the 
principal legal sources accessible to case workers.  Nevertheless, the publication of 
the API on credibility follows similar moves in other legal systems to provide special 
guidance on this issue, such as the lengthy advisory paper, „Assessment of Credibility 
in Claims for Refugee Protection‟ produced by the Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee Board in 2004.
21
   
 
1.2 Three techniques for determining credibility 
The UK‟s API characterises the techniques for accepting or denying credibility as 
checking for „internal credibility‟, „external credibility‟ and „plausibility‟.  These are 
the three categories of test that Amanda Weston used to describe immigration 
Adjudicators‟ practice in her analysis published in 1998.22  It might therefore be noted 
that by formally adopting these categories, the API has converted Weston‟s 
description into rudimentary prescription.   
Nevertheless, it is in this section of the API that the most progress is made in 
terms of giving practical advice to decision makers.  There have been a number of 
significant academic studies published that demonstrate the vulnerable position of 
                                                                                                                                            
many UK universities is three „A‟ levels, with many of the leading institutions requiring all three to be 
at the highest grade.   
21
 Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division, „Assessment of Credibility in Claims 
for Refugee Protection‟ (2004). 
22
 Weston, n. 2 above, 88. 
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asylum applicants.
23
  From the content of the API, it appears that the publication of 
such works is starting to have an effect.    
Although in relation to internal credibility decision makers are told to watch 
for the level of detail and introduction of inconsistencies, the API clearly indicates 
that there may be mitigating circumstances in some cases such as „mental or 
emotional trauma, inarticulateness, fear, mistrust of authorities, feelings of shame, 
painful memories particularly those of a sexual nature‟.24   However the advice that 
decision makers must only „try to ensure‟25 that any inconsistencies are put to the 
applicant so that they have chance to explain them does not go nearly far enough.    
In relation to „external credibility‟ decision makers are reminded that if the 
applicant‟s statements are not consistent with objective country information they must 
put that inconsistency to them in order for them to have the opportunity to account for 
the discrepancy.  Decision makers are also reminded that the absence of objective 




Finally, in relation to potentially the most subjective of all grounds for 
credibility findings, plausibility, decision makers are reminded not to construct their 
own theories of how the applicant or others in the account ought to have behaved, or 
to assess their behaviour against what would be plausible in the UK.  This goes some 
                                                 
23
 For example H. Baillot, S. Cowan, V. Munro, „Seen but not heard? Parallels and dissonances in the 
treatment of rape narratives across the asylum and criminal justice contexts‟ (2009) 36 Journal of Law 
and Society 195-219;  J. Cohen, „Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of 
Recall in the Testimony of Asylum Seekers‟ 13 IJRL 293-309 (2002);  J. Millbank, „“The Ring of 
Truth”: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group Refugee Determinations‟ 
21 IJRL 1 (2009); J. Herlihy & S. W. Turner, „The Psychology of Seeking Protection‟ 21 IJRL 171 
(2009). 
24
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 9. 
25
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 8. 
26
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 9. 
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way to avoiding the implicit construction of a hypothetical „reasonable persecutor‟ 
against which to judge the plausibility of alleged persecutors‟ actions.27  Applications 
should not be rejected simply because the decision maker can imagine a „better‟ way 
to have carried out the alleged persecution.     
Although the advice in this section of the API may help improve the quality of 
decision making, the application of the tests could be made more objective.  The 
introduction to the API states that decision makers will often have to decide whether 
„they believe‟ the applicant‟s evidence [emphasis added].28  Later, the API seems 
resigned to the fact that assessing a claim‟s credibility „inevitably involves an element 
of subjectivity on the decision maker‟s part‟,29 although granted its advice is 
specifically designed minimize subjective decision making.  Michael Kagan‟s 
approach to objective credibility assessment is an improvement upon this, by 
reminding decision makers that the question is not whether they believe the applicant, 




1.3 The legal sources of the UK’s API on credibility 
The real problem with the API does not concern its practical advice about making 
credibility findings, but its explanation of the legal impact of credibility findings upon 
the outcome of the case.  This problem stems from the ambitious but ultimately 
flawed attempt to draw together within the API a fairly wide range of materials of 
                                                 
27
 J. Sweeney, „The “lure” of facts in asylum appeals: Critiquing the practice of judges‟ in S. Smith 
(ed.) Applying Theory to Policy and Practice: Issues for Critical Reflection (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007), 
19-35, 27.  
28
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 2. 
29
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 8. 
30
 Kagan, n. 4 above, 403. 
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differing legal statuses.
31
  It is necessary therefore briefly to review the relationship 
between these materials. 
According to its introduction, the UK‟s API on credibility „takes into account‟ 
primary legislation, the UK‟s Immigration Rules, the EU Qualification Directive,32 
the UK case law and UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status.
33
  It should be „read alongside‟ the more general APIs on 
„Considering the Asylum Claim‟ and „Considering Human Rights Claims‟.34  It is 
notable and unfortunate that the API does not make reference to the 1998 UNHCR 
„Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims‟,35 since this also gives 
specific advice on determining credibility.   
                                                 
31
 Although it does not state it in the introduction, the API on credibility also at various points directs 
its readers to what it names as APIs on „Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim‟, „Medical Evidence‟, 
„Conducting Asylum Interviews‟, „Certification under section 94 of the NIA Act 2002‟ and „Further 
representations and fresh claims‟.  These titles do not map onto the APIs available from UKBA.  For 
example, there is no API on or entitled „medical evidence‟ (although there is an API entitled „Medical 
foundation‟, which gives advice on dealing with applicants who have a medical report prepared by 
registered charity the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, and an APU notice on 





 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and 
the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ No L304/12. 
33
 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees: UN doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 
(2nd edn. Geneva 1992). 
34
 It is not totally clear to which other APIs the credibility API is referring at this point.  It is 
understood that the first reference is to the API actually entitled, „Assessing the Asylum Claim‟.  There 
is no API on „Considering Human Rights Claims‟, although there are separate APIs on „Article 8 
ECHR‟, „ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights‟ and „Humanitarian Protection‟.   
35
 UNHCR, „Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims‟: 16 December 1998 available 
at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3338.html> (accessed 16 September 2009); it is noted 
below in the text at fn 45, in agreement with Kagan (n. 4 above), that even this document is 
inconsistent in its use of the term „credibility‟.  
Page 11 of 42 
As mentioned above, the UN Refugee Convention makes no mention of 
credibility, but the influential UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status
36
 nevertheless uses the term at several points.  The 
Handbook is not binding on state parties to the UN Refugee Convention, but it is of 
considerable persuasive authority.  Despite this authority, the UK Border Agency API 
on the UNHCR states clearly that „if there is a discrepancy between the Handbook 
and UK law or UK Border Agency policy, law and policy will take precedence.‟37 
The Immigration Act 1971 is the legal foundation of the UK‟s immigration 
laws.
38
  The first dedicated provisions on asylum came in the form of the Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Act (AIAA) 1993, which in Section 1 defines the claim of 
asylum as one asserting that to be removed from the UK would be contrary to the 
UK‟s obligations under the Refugee Convention.39  Section 2 AIAA 1993 prohibits 
the UK‟s Immigration Rules from putting in place any practice that would be contrary 
to the Refugee Convention. 
The Immigration Rules are issued under section 3(2) of the 1971 Act, and 
enjoy a comparable (although not identical) legal status to delegated legislation.
40
  
They contain much of the authoritative guidance on the operation of the immigration 
                                                 
36
 UNHCR Handbook, n. 33 above. 
37
 API „The United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees‟ (2006, rebranded 2009), available from 
UK Border Agency, „Guidance and Instructions‟  
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/> (accessed 16 September 2009) 
38
 For an historical introduction to UK legislation and its judicial supervision see e.g. G. Care, „The 
judiciary, the state and the refugee: The evolution of judicial protection in asylum – a UK perspective‟ 
(2006) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1421-1456. 
39
 R. Cholewinski, „Enforced Destitution of Asylum Seekers in the United Kingdom: The Denial of 
Fundamental Rights‟ 10 IJRL 462-498 (1998) at fn 54 notes that whilst this provision pins UK law to 
the Refugee Convention, it does not necessarily incorporate it.    
40
 See generally S. Juss, „Rule-making and the Immigration Rules – A retreat from law‟ (1992) 13 
Statute Law Review 150-164.  
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and asylum processes in the UK.  In recent years, the Immigration Rules have been 
used as one of several means of transposing EU law on refugees.  EU law on this 
topic has been gathering in pace since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998,
41
 and 
presently takes the form of three principal directives; the Qualification Directive, the 
Reception Directive,
42
 and the Procedures Directive.
43
  It is the first of these that 
contains rules relevant to credibility. 
The flaw of the API on credibility is to present these disparate materials as if 
they are consistent on the significance of credibility in the RSD process and its 
relationship to basic concepts in refugee law such as the benefit of the doubt and the 
standard of proof.  They are not.  In particular, there are two very different 
interpretations given to the significance of credibility detectible in these sources; one 
broad and one narrow.   
 
2. Broad and narrow approaches to credibility   
The introduction above alluded to the general consensus that assessing credibility is a 
very important stage in the RSD process.  However, that consensus does not extend to 
exactly what it means to assess credibility.  Michael Kagan‟s analysis identified two 
                                                 
41
 For the background see, E. Guild, „The Europeanisation of Europe‟s asylum policy‟ 18 IJRL 630-651 
(2006); on the EU Qualification Directive see H. Lambert, „The EU Qualification Directive, its impact 
on the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and international law‟ (2006) 55 ICLQ 161-192; R. 
Thomas, „Assessing the Credibility of Asylum Claims: EU and UK Approaches Examined‟ (2006) 8 
European Journal of Migration and Law 79-96.  
42
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC on the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers [2003] 
OJ No L 31/18. 
43
 Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
and withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ No L 326/13. 
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main approaches,
44
 which will here be termed broad and narrow interpretations of 
credibility. 
The broadest interpretation is that credibility is about whether the application 
is meritorious and, consequently, successful.  On a broad interpretation of credibility, 
therefore, to describe a claim as „credible‟ is to say that the applicant‟s statements are 
true and that they warrant international protection.  It is shorthand for expressing the 
strength of the case.  This usage of the term „credible‟ is fairly widespread.  Indeed, as 
Kagan observed, even UNHCR has occasionally referred to the „overall credibility of 
the applicant‟s claim‟.45 
Kagan advocates a narrower view of credibility that sees the conclusion that a 
particular statement is „credible‟ as more contingent.46  It is less about the outcome of 
the case, or even the conclusive proof of material facts, and more of a pre-requisite 
evidential step.
47
  A „credible‟ but otherwise unsupported statement is one that is not 
certainly true, not yet proven but, because it is plausible, consistent, and reflects 
generally known facts, must not be dismissed from the consideration of whether the 
applicant has a well founded fear of persecution.  The UNHCR Handbook describes 
                                                 
44
 Kagan, n. 4 above, 369. 
45
 UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof, n. 35 above, para. 11, quoted by Kagan n. 4 above, 
369 at fn9, who also observes that this paragraph in fact uses credibility in both its broad and narrow 
senses.  
46
 Kagan n. 4 above, 371; see also Hathaway & Hicks‟ summary of similar rules in several 
jurisdictions: J. Hathaway & W. Hicks „Is there a Subjective Element in the Refugee Convention‟s 
Requirement of a “well-founded” fear‟ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law, 505-562; c.f. 
Norman, n. 5 above, 291, who states that credibility is „about making findings of fact‟.     
47
 G. Noll, „Evidentiary Assessment in Refugee Status Determination and the EU Qualification 
Directive‟ (2006) 12 EPL 295-317, 310 et seq.  
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admitting unsupported but credible statements as evidence as giving asylum seekers 
the „benefit of the doubt‟.48   
The present analysis shows not only that it is possible to distinguish broad and 
narrow views of credibility, but also that the narrow view is preferable since it 
facilitates a clearer demarcation of the applicable legal concepts.   
 
2.1 The UK’s API and its predominantly ‘broad’ approach to credibility 
The API summarises elements of the narrow understanding of credibility, namely the 
techniques for determining credibility and the conditions to be met before an applicant 
gains the benefit of the doubt, but it amplifies the relevance of the applicant‟s general 
credibility and presents credibility findings as going to the strength of the case overall 
rather than just to the admissibility of evidence.  The orientation of the API towards 
this broad interpretation of credibility begins in its introduction: 
The process of determining whether an applicant is in need of international 
protection often requires a decision maker to decide whether they believe the 
applicant‟s evidence about past and present events and how much weight they 
attach to that evidence. In determining this, decision makers must assess the 





This instruction suggests from the outset that the „credibility of the applicant‟, and not 
just the evidence, is an issue whenever the occurrence of a past or present event is in 
                                                 
48
 UNHCR Handbook, n. 33 above, para. 196; Noll has also described this use of the term „credibility‟ 
in the Handbook  as referring to „source credibility‟: G. Noll, „Evidentiary Assessment Under the 
Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the Intersubjectivity of Fear‟ in G. Noll (ed.), Proof, Evidentiary 
Assessment & Credibility in Asylum Procedures (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 141-159, 150. 
49
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 2. 
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dispute.  This means that in addition to examining the internal or external consistency 
and plausibility of the account overall, decision makers are directed to look at factors 
such as the promptness and mode of the application for asylum as credibility issues, 
and in isolation from the question of whether a well founded fear exists.  We shall 
return to personal, or general, credibility below.
50
   
The centrality of credibility is stressed further into the API, where it is stated 
that, 
In assessing the credibility of a claim as a whole, decision makers must assess 
the credibility of claimed facts about past and present events that go to the 
core of the claim.
51
 [emphasis added] 
 
This confirms the adoption of a broad approach to credibility findings, allowing them 
to impact upon the case „as a whole‟.  There is no distinction between the credibility 
of evidence and the proof of facts, and no distinction between unsupported statements 
and other types of evidence.   
 This is exacerbated by the way that the API does not sufficiently explain the 
relationship of credibility to other issues raised within it, such as the burden of proof, 
the consideration of evidence submitted by the applicant, and the establishment and 
consideration of the material facts of the claim.
52
  Perhaps most importantly, the API 
on credibility also omits any mention of Immigration Rule (IR) 339J or Article 4(3) 
                                                 
50
 In section 4.3 below it is shown that the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.,) Act 
2004 also contributes to the elevation of „general credibility‟ as a factor in refugee status determination 
in the UK.   
51
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 8. 
52
 Of course it might be argued that the fault is with the title of the API on credibility, rather than its 
contents. 
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EU QD – which are in fact the main provisions on assessing applications for 
asylum.
53
   
IR 339J and Article 4(3) EU QD stress that the assessment of applications for 
recognition as a refugee must be individual, impartial and objective.  Both list a range 
of factors that must be taken into account.  The provisions on credibility and the 
benefit of the doubt follow in IR 339L and Article 4(5) Qualification Directive, and it 
is clear that they are supplemental.  They apply when an individual‟s statements are 
not supported by documentary or other evidence (i.e. they outline the narrow 
understanding of credibility).     
In its conclusion the API states that by following the approach outlined within 
it, „decision makers should be able to establish the past and present facts of the 
claim‟.54  This approach appears to present testing credibility as a broad, alternative, 
unifying means by which all factual questions in asylum cases may determined.    
Moreover since credibility is now equated with conclusively „establishing‟ the facts, it 
is logical that the testing for internal consistency, external consistency, plausibility, 
and „general credibility‟, is carried out stringently.  Without reference to the 
applicable law on the standard of proof in refugee cases, it seems that the applicant 
must nevertheless „prove‟ their credibility.    
 
3. The narrow approach: credibility as admissibility  
                                                 
53
 The API does summarise Article 4(1) EU QD and IR 339I, which state that it is the applicant‟s duty 
to present as soon as possible the elements required to substantiate their claim: API „Assessing 
Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 3.  The Immigration Rules and API both substitute the phrase „material 
factors‟ where the Directive had used the term „elements‟.   
54
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 13. 
Page 17 of 42 
The concept of credibility in its narrow sense can work in favour of the applicant at 
least as much as it may form the basis of a negative decision.  The UNHCR advice 
explains that the burden of proof is upon the applicant, but that in some circumstances 
the decision maker must „use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary 
evidence in support of the application‟.55  It goes on, 
Even such independent research may not, however, always be successful and 
there may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such cases, if 
the applicant's account appears credible, he should, unless there are good 
reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.
56
    
 
The key here is that UNHCR sees credibility as an alternative to proof, and not a 
synonym for it.  It is about giving the benefit of the doubt to a credible account in 
circumstances when proof has not been possible.  „Being credible‟ is different both to 
„being proven‟ and to „being true‟. 
Because credibility and proof are demonstrably not synonymous, it can be 
confirmed that the threshold of „credible‟ is lower even than the low standard of proof 
applicable in asylum cases.  This realisation should caution decision makers against 
too readily equating minor inconsistencies or stories of narrow escapes with 
implausibility and a lack of internal or external credibility.  In order more fully to 
understand this argument some basic evidential concepts are explored here.  A broad 
approach to credibility, seeing credibility as truth, would obscure the distinction 
                                                 
55
 UNHCR Handbook, n. 33 above, para. 196; on the shared elements of the burden of proof see also B. 
Gorlick, „Common Burdens and Standards: Legal Elements in Assessing Claims to Refugee Status‟ 15 
IJRL 357-376 (2003), 361.   
56
 UNHCR Handbook, n. 33 above, para. 196. 
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between „credible‟ and „proven‟ consequently raising the threshold of credibility and 
more readily denying applicants the benefit of the doubt.     
 
3.1 Types of evidence 
The UK‟s API on credibility is sufficiently clear that an applicant for asylum will not 
have to prove each fact with documentary or other evidence.
57
  It quotes the UNHCR 
Handbook‟s observation that „cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all 
his statements will be the exception rather than the rule‟.58  The API stresses that 
„applicants often cannot substantiate their statements by independent documentary or 
other evidence‟59 [emphasis per the original].   
Citing IR 339I the API goes on to state that evidence will consist of written 
statements, asylum interviews, and other documentary evidence.  However, it does 
not clarify that documentary and other evidence submitted by the applicant or the 
state has a dual use.
60
  In the first place, documentary or other evidence may in and of 
itself demonstrate a well founded fear of persecution, regardless of what the applicant 
has said and whether the decision maker believes it.
61
  It is only in the second place 
that documentary or other evidence may be used to determine credibility in its narrow 
sense: whether the applicant‟s unsupported statements are broadly consistent with 
                                                 
57
 API, „Assessing Credibility‟, n6 above, 3 & 4. 
58
 API, „Assessing Credibility‟, n6 above, 4; quoting UNHCR Handbook n. 33 above, para. 196. 
59
 API, „Assessing Credibility‟, n6 above, 4. 
60
 Weston, n. 2 above, 88. 
61
 Kagan gave the example of a Jew fleeing Nazi Germany in 1940 or a Tutsi fleeing Rwanda in 1994 
who had made an entirely false claim, but who might nevertheless qualify for international protection 
on the basis of documentary or other evidence about their ethnicity and ongoing genocide in their 
country of origin: Kagan, n. 4 above, 370.  It is probably fair to say that cases like this are rare in 
practice. 
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known facts.  If they are, then they should be given the benefit of the doubt and 
admitted as evidence towards satisfying the standard of proof.     
 
3.2 Some evidential concepts 
It is generally accepted that formal rules of evidence are not appropriate for asylum 
cases because of the particular predicament in which asylum seekers they find 
themselves.  In the UK a further justification is that the RSD process is a form of 
administrative decision making on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (the Home Secretary), and the route of appeal is not to a court but to an 
administrative tribunal: the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.
62
  Nevertheless, and in 
order further to distinguish „credibility‟ from „proof‟, it can be helpful analytically to 





Starting with materiality, this is the process of determining which factual claims made 
by the applicant would, if they were proven, be key (i.e. material) to their legal 
recognition as a refugee.  If the applicant‟s situation does not give rise to any facts 
that would be material to refugee status, then they do not have a claim for asylum.       
                                                 
62
 See R. Thomas, „Evaluating tribunal adjudication: administrative justice and asylum appeals‟ (2005) 
25 Legal Studies 462-498, 469. 
63
 Anthony Good‟s work on anthropology in asylum cases makes a similar observation in introducing 
his chapters on credibility, weight, and proof in turn: A. Good, Anthropology and Expertise in the 
Asylum Courts (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish 2007), 187; On other lessons to be learned from 
criminal justice, see A. Popovic, „Evidentiary Assessment and Non-Refoulement: Insights from the 
Criminal Process‟, in G. Noll (ed.), Proof, Evidentiary Assessment & Credibility in Asylum Procedures 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 27-53.   
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In an asylum application this means that the decision maker will have to 
extract the material facts from the potentially voluminous factual claims made by the 
applicant.  The UK‟s API summarises this point well where it states that,   
A material fact goes to the core of a claim and is fundamental to why an 
individual fears persecution, and will be central to the decision that will be 
made.  It is the role of the decision maker to identify which facts are material 




This stage shapes the rest of the enquiry because the material facts operate as a set of 
conditions which, if met, result in legal recognition of refugee status.  The rest of the 
enquiry examines pieces of evidence to determine if they contribute to proving the 
material facts and thereby meeting the overall standard of proof.  It is here where the 
API‟s use of evidential terminology becomes clouded.  The API‟s advice that the 
decision maker is required „to form a view on the extent to which they think each 
material fact is credible‟65 is especially muddled: „facts‟ must be „proven‟; only 
distinct pieces of „evidence‟ should be subjected to „credibility‟ analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Relevance 
The second key evidential concept is relevance.  Of each piece of evidence submitted, 
the decision maker must decide if it is relevant to one of the material facts.   
It is disturbing that the UK‟s API states that some facts, such as failing to 
apply for asylum until leave to remain on other grounds has been denied, „may be 
                                                 
64
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 6. 
65
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 7. 
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relevant to an assessment of the applicant‟s credibility even though they are not 
directly material to the substance of the claim itself.‟66   
There are no grounds whatsoever for enquiring into the credibility of the 
applicant unless it bears upon the material facts of the case since, as established 
above, credibility in and of itself is not part of refugee definition.  These „non-
relevant‟ facts, the API advises, may be important when the benefit of the doubt is 
considered.
67
  This advice is not consistent with the API‟s more helpful later 
statement that, „It is generally unnecessary, and sometimes counter-productive, for the 
decision maker to focus upon minor or peripheral facts that are not material to the 
claim.‟68 
     
3.2.3 Admissibility 
If a piece of evidence is relevant to a material fact then the decision maker must 
decide if there is any reason why it should not be admitted as evidence.  This is the 
concept of admissibility.  In criminal law, for example, there are often complex 
exclusionary rules about suppressing illegally obtained evidence.   
Credibility in asylum applications is not an exclusionary evidential rule, but 
rather an alleviating evidential rule.  This understanding is supported by Gregor 
Noll‟s close analysis of the Article 4(5) EU QD, to which we shall turn shortly.69  As 
an alleviating evidential rule, the law on credibility gives applicants the benefit of the 
doubt by allowing the admission of evidence that would normally be suppressed – as 
                                                 
66
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 6. 
67
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 6. 
68
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 8. 
69
 Noll, n. 47 above. 
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long as it is „credible‟.  To conclude that an unsupported statement is credible should 
be merely to conclude that it is admissible as evidence. 
 
3.2.4 Weight 
Finally, if the evidence is relevant to a material fact and admissible, the decision 
maker must ascribe some weight to it.  It is perhaps only at this stage that what is 
presently understood as the „general credibility‟ of the applicant should be an issue.  
Some evidence will carry much weight, some will not.  Some will carry no weight at 
all.  This goes for all evidence, including the applicant‟s credible statements and any 
documentary or expert evidence produced.    The decision maker must conclude 
whether the cumulative weight of all the relevant and admissible evidence is sufficient 
to meet the standard of proof.   
In summary, this section has reviewed the concepts of materiality, relevance, 
admissibility and proof.  If „credibility as admissibility‟ is clearly distinguished from 
issues of weight and proof, then a narrow and neutral interpretation of credibility can 
be applied more readily.  To be admissible as evidence an unsupported statement does 
not have to be proven; it merely has to be credible.  This, in turn, focuses the decision 
maker on the determinative question of whether the applicant has proven to the 
applicable standard that they have a well founded fear of persecution, rather than on 
the more elastic tests of internal and external credibility or inherent plausibility.     
The standard of proof in asylum applications is discussed in section 5 below.  
Meanwhile, in the next section, the role of the benefit of the doubt in relation to 
„credibility as admissibility‟ is explored in order further to explain why the threshold 
of „being credible‟ must be set low.   
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4. Credibility and the benefit of the doubt 
The UK‟s API on credibility attempts to summarise the law on giving the benefit of 
the doubt to credible but unsupported statements.  The main problem encountered 
thus far is that without clearly identifying the supplemental role of credibility findings 
as elements of an alleviating evidential rule, the threshold of „credible‟ is placed too 
close to „proven‟.  However there is a further problem.  Without being pinned directly 
to the admissibility of evidence, additional conditions unrelated to the consistency or 
plausibility of the account are introduced before the benefit of the doubt is given and 
the statement or claim as a whole is accepted as „credible‟.  However not all of the 
problems stem from the API itself: the source law in the form of IR 339L 
(implementing Article 4(5) EU QD),
70
 especially as amended by the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, is problematic in its own right. 
 
4.1 The approach of the API to the benefit of the doubt 
The UK‟s API on credibility introduces the alleviating evidential rule in IR 339L thus, 
Where a material claimed fact cannot be corroborated by objective country 
information or other evidence but appears to be internally credible and the 
applicant is credible in relation to other material facts, the decision maker 





                                                 
70
 Secretary of State for the Home Department, „Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules‟ (Cm 
6918, 2006); some parts of the EU QD are implemented by the Refugee or Person in Need of 
International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. 
71
 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 9. 
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The API then lists the specific conditions that, according to IR 339L, must be met 
before the individual can gain the benefit of the doubt.  It is significant that the API 
suggests that even where the conditions are met the decision maker should only 
„consider‟ giving the benefit of the doubt.  By contrast the Immigration Rules specify 
certain conditions which, if fulfilled, will result in the acceptance of an unsupported 
statement.   
 
4.2 The content of the alleviating evidential rule 
The content of the alleviating evidential rule embodying the benefit of the doubt is 
supplied by IR 339L, and the API stresses that „all‟ the conditions listed there must be 
met [emphasis per the original].
72
  The conditions, listed in the API and deriving from 
the Immigration Rules, are that, 
(i) the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate his asylum claim or 
establish that he is a person eligible humanitarian protection or substantiate his 
human rights claim; 
(ii) all material factors at the person's disposal have been submitted, and a 
satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been 
given; 
(iii) the person's statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not 
run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the 
person's case; 
(iv) the person has made an asylum claim or sought to establish that he is a 
person eligible for humanitarian protection or made a human rights claim at 
                                                 
72
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the earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for 
not having done so; and 
(v) the general credibility of the person has been established 
  
These conditions for accepting an unsupported statement are a mixture of pure 
credibility, such as point (iii), and other wide discretionary considerations.
73
  It is 
notable that in its introduction to these conditions the API has seemingly added a 
circular and further requirement; that to gain the benefit of the doubt the applicant 
must be „credible in relation to other material facts‟.74  This does not appear in the 
actual list of conditions in IR 339L or Article 4(5) EU QD.    
The normal sense of giving the „benefit of the doubt‟ would be a presumption 
in favour of accepting the statement.  This is the understanding of the UNHCR which, 
it can be recalled, advises that where a statement cannot be substantiated, or where it 
is not susceptible of proof then, „if the applicant's account appears credible, he should, 
unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.‟75  The 
Immigration Rules and API turn this simple advice on its head, dissembling it into a 
series of successive hurdles each of which could deny the benefit of the doubt.   
 
4.3 ‘General Credibility’ and the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 
The final condition for gaining the benefit of the doubt listed in IR 339L and 
reproduced in the API is that „the general credibility of the person has been 
established‟.  Recall also that the introduction to the API indicates that decision 
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 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 9. 
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 UNHCR Handbook, n. 33 above, para. 196. 
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makers „must assess the credibility of the applicant‟ as well as the evidence that they 
submit.
76
   
The only guidance on the meaning of „general credibility‟ in IR 339L comes 
in the form of IR 339N, which states that in determining it the Secretary of State will 
apply the provisions in section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, 
etc.) Act (AI(ToC)A) 2004.  This provision, and background to it, is summarised at 
length in the UK‟s API on credibility.77 
Section 8 AI(ToC)A 2004 requires decision makers to take certain behaviour 
as damaging to the applicant‟s credibility.  Noting that this section „plainly has its 
dangers‟ if it were read as a direction as to how fact finding should be conducted,78 
the Court of Appeal has offered an alternative construction of section 8(1) that would 
not offend constitutional principles such as the separation of powers: the behaviour 
listed in section 8 should be taken into account „as potentially damaging the 
claimant‟s credibility‟ [emphasis added].79  In the alternative, the Court of Appeal 
added that the same provision could read as requiring that the listed conduct should be 
taken into account „when assessing any damage to the claimant's credibility‟.80     
Section 8(2) states that damaging behaviour is anything „that the deciding 
authority thinks‟ is designed to conceal information, is designed to mislead, or is 
designed to obstruct or delay the process [emphasis added].  In addition to these 
general categories of damaging behaviour, section 8(3) AI(ToC)A 2004 then specifies 
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 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 2 
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 API „Assessing Credibility‟, n. 6 above, 12 et seq. 
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 JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878, per Pill LJ at 
para. 19; on these dangers and their implications for the separation of powers, see Thomas, n. 41 above, 
95 and Ensor et al, n. 10 above, 96. 
79
 JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, n78 above, para. 20, per Pill LJ. 
80
 ibid. 
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certain prohibited actions that „shall‟ be treated as designed to conceal information or 
to mislead.  These include failing without reasonable explanation to produce a 
passport, producing a fake passport, and the destruction, alteration or disposal without 
reasonable explanation of a passport, ticket or other travel document.  Finally, the 
failure without reasonable explanation to answer a question of the deciding authority 
is also deemed to mislead or conceal and, therefore, to damage the applicant‟s general 
credibility.   
It can be observed firstly that the types of behaviour listed are precisely those 
to which even „genuine‟ refugees may frequently have resort.81  Secondly, the 
safeguard of providing a reasonable explanation may well be workable,
82
 but it is a 
distracting pre-requisite that works as a barrier to considering the real question of 
whether the applicant has a well founded fear of persecution.
83
  These issues could be 
considered together without being seen as additional hurdles.   
Moreover, sections 8(4) to 8(6) AI(ToC)A 2004 specify certain behaviours 
that do not benefit from the „reasonable explanation‟ safeguard at all, namely failing 
to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to make an application for asylum in a 
third country en route; failure to make application before being notified of an 
immigration decision; and failure to make an application before being arrested under 
immigration powers.
84
    
Section 8 AI(ToC)A 2004 concentrates attention upon the applicant‟s means 
and itinerary of travel, and their behaviour in the country in which they claim asylum.  
The same may be said of the requirement in IR 339L that in order to gain the benefit 
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 Ensor et al, n. 10 above, 96; Gorlick, n. 55 above, 371. 
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of the doubt the application must have been made „at the earliest possible time‟.  
Attempts to punish or discourage particular behaviour have no logical relation to a 
rule about the alleviation of an evidential burden.  Likewise there is no necessary link 
between behaviour since the alleged events giving rise to the fear of persecution and 
the truthfulness of those allegations.  It is, as Thomas put it, „an unreasonable 
evidential presumption‟.85   
It is perfectly legitimate for the RSD process to shape the behaviour of 
applicants towards administrative efficiency, but it should never be done by threats to 
reduce their chances of success by undermining their credibility.  To do so would 
fatally compromise the objectivity of the process.  Examination of the applicant‟s 
travel itinerary or behaviour in the UK may tell decision makers whether they are a 
„good customer‟, whether they are convenient and co-operative, but it will not reveal 
very much about whether they have a well founded fear of persecution.   
The only rational link between evidence about the promptness or mode of the 
applicant‟s claim could be to subjective fear, in the sense that these behaviours may 
be indicative of dishonesty; that fear of persecution is not the applicant‟s principal 
motivation.  If this is the argument that is being made, then it should be clearly 
articulated as an issue of proof, and not be confined to the admissibility of evidence. 
Given these concerns about its content, the most troubling element of section 8 
AI(ToC)A 2004 is its potential to put the notion of credibility centre stage in the 
determination of refugee status, rather than confining it to applying the benefit of the 
doubt (i.e. through IR 339L).  Section 8 AI(ToC)A 2004 begins by stating simply that, 
In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a 
person who makes an asylum claim or a human rights claim, a deciding 
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authority shall take account, as damaging the claimant‟s credibility, of any 
behaviour to which this section applies. […] 
 
This broad interpretation of credibility gives the impression that credibility is a 
legitimate consideration in relation to believing any statement, not just the 
unsupported statements that are being considered under rule 339L.  The UK‟s API on 
credibility reinforces this impression, stating that the 2004 Act,  
provides a framework for the consideration of credibility issues in asylum and 
human rights applications […].  In deciding whether or not to believe a 
statement made by or on behalf of an applicant, [the] authorities must regard 
certain specified behaviour as damaging to the credibility of the applicant.
86
   
 
This, surely, is wrong.  As Noll has observed in his analysis of the Qualification 
Directive, the applicant‟s credibility „at large‟ is not relevant to the overarching 
question of whether there is a risk of harm on return: only the credibility of the 
applicant‟s statements about those risks is relevant.87     
The UK API‟s summary of section 8 AI(ToC)A is, however, mildly helpful in 
that it clearly reminds decision makers that the behaviours listed are not to be given 
more weight than other factors that impact on credibility.  Unfortunately it also adds 
that credibility „can be undermined in other ways and, depending on the 
circumstances, it may be appropriate to refuse on other credibility grounds entirely.‟88  
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Nevertheless, it admits that points in favour of the applicant may outweigh those 
against, even though the negative points include „section 8 points‟.89     
Again fairly helpfully, the API reminds decision makers that a „poor 
immigration history does not, on its own, justify the rejection of a claim‟.90  Decision 




From the forgoing analysis it can be seen that the role of the benefit of the 
doubt in the UK is not altogether clear.  Whilst the content of the alleviating 
evidential rule in Article 4(5) EU QD is spelled out in the Immigration Rules and 
summarised in the API, its significance to the outcome of the case is amplified by 
section 8 AI(ToC)A 2004.  The amplification of credibility from an alleviating 
evidential rule to a decisive factor is all the more worrying given the introduction of  a 
range of factors unrelated to evidence about the existence of a well founded fear that 
AI(ToC)A 2004 suggests will undermine applicants‟ „general credibility‟.   
 
5. Credibility and proof 
Since credibility is an element of an alleviating evidential rule, it is anathema to ask 
asylum seekers to „prove‟ credibility.92  To show that a statement is credible is not the 
same as to show that it is true.  Indeed this would be to impose a higher standard in 
relation to evidential admissibility than in relation to the applicable standard of proof 
for the case as a whole, which is usually placed fairly low in asylum cases because of 
                                                 
89
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the recognition that refugees face inherent difficulties in proving a well founded fear 
of persecution.
93
   
As noted in the introduction above, in the UK applicants must demonstrate to 
„a reasonable degree of likelihood‟ that they will be persecuted for a Convention 
reason if returned to their own country.
94
  UK law, it will be shown shortly, also 
recognizes that the test for a well founded fear is a single, composite one applicable 
instantaneously to past facts and prospective risk.  In spite of making a cross reference 
to paragraph 6.4. of the API on „Assessing the Claim‟,95 which gives a perfectly 
adequate explanation of the law on proof to „a reasonable degree of likelihood‟,96 the 
API on credibility itself presents a partial reading of the leading case of Karanakaran 
and shatters the composite test. 
 
5.1 The API and Karanakaran 
The API introduces the case by stating that the Court of Appeal in Karanakaran 
„outlined an approach to assessing evidence of past and present material facts in 
asylum claims‟.97  This is not, in fact, what the Karanakaran case did.  This section 
shows that Karanakaran is about the standard of proof in asylum cases, and the 
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relationship between proving past events and future risk.  Crucially, the case explains 
that both are to be proven to the lower Sivakumaran
98
 standard (a reasonable degree 
of likelihood) because they are part of a single, composite test.  The case also explains 
that the facts of the case should be considered cumulatively rather than in isolation.   
The UK API‟s explanation of the Karanakaran the UK‟s API begins by 
stating that, 
Decision makers must consider each material fact about the past or present. If 
the application falls to be refused, they should state in the reasons for refusal 
letter which elements are accepted or not accepted and why, before 
proceeding to the assessment of a future risk of persecution. [italics added; 
bold as per the original] 
 
This passage clearly recommends both disaggregating the facts and separating their 
consideration from the question of prospective risk.  The conclusion of the API states 
that, by following the approach the API has outlined, decision makers „should be able 
to establish the past and present facts of the claim‟.  It continues, 
Once these facts have been established, decision makers will then need to 
consider if there is a future risk of persecution, and if the criteria for refugee 




   
On the consideration of separate facts, the Court of Appeal in Karanakaran actually 
stated that it had been wrong for the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to „consider each 
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matter in isolation as opposed to considering their potential cumulative effect‟.100  
Sedley LJ drew attention to the assenting view of Kirby J in the Australian High 
Court case of Wu Shan Liang, which had explained that, 
[T]he decision-maker must not, by a process of factual findings on particular 
elements of the material which is provided, foreclose reasonable speculation 





Most importantly, Karanakaran confirms that proving a well founded fear of 
persecution is a single composite question incorporating past and present facts and 
risk.  Brooke LJ explicitly confirmed the approach of the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal in Kaja,
102
 which had described it at as a „one-stage process‟.  The Tribunal 
had considered that if there were a two-stage process, where proof of present and past 
facts was followed by an assessment of risk, then any uncertainties in the evidence 
would be excluded from the second stage.  This, summarised Brooke LJ, „could not 
be right‟ according to the Tribunal.103 
Sedley LJ in Karanakaran arrived at the same conclusion by citing with 
approval Simon Brown LJ‟s judgment in Ravichandran, which had stated that, 
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In my judgment the issue whether a person or group of people have a „well-





Sedley LJ‟s judgment in Karanakaran continued, confirming the composite question 
doctrine in a passage that merits quotation at length,  
While […] it may well be necessary to approach the Convention questions 
themselves in discrete order, how they are approached and evaluated should 
henceforward be regarded not as an assault course on which hurdles of varying 
heights are encountered by the asylum seeker with the decision-maker acting 
as umpire, nor as a forum in which the improbable is magically endowed with 
the status of certainty, but as a unitary process of evaluation of evidential 





It would seem, therefore, that the API‟s summary of Karanakaran is highly 
problematic.  It could also be argued that, since Karanakaran deals with the standard 
of proof rather than credibility per se, the API on credibility has no real need to go 
into it all.  However, Brooke LJ‟s explanation in Karanakaran of the decision in Kaja 
refers to the significance of evidence to which decision makers attach „some 
credence‟.106  It is to this which we shall turn now.     
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5.2 Credence and credibility 
In a very significant passage of Karanakaran, which the UK‟s API on credibility 
reproduces, Brooke LJ explained exactly what sort of evidence the decision in Kaja 
identified that decision makers would come across, and which they must take into 
account:   
(1) evidence they are certain about; 
(2) evidence they think is probably true; 
(3) evidence to which they are willing to attach some credence, even if they 
could not go so far as to say it is probably true; 
(4) evidence to which they are not willing to attach any credence at all. 
 
The effect of Kaja [Brooke LJ continued] is that the decision-maker is not 
bound to exclude category (3) evidence as he/she would be if deciding issues 




Note that this is about „evidence‟.  If an unsupported statement is not credible, then it 
is not admissible as evidence and does not fall within any of these four categories.  
However if, applying the benefit of the doubt, a decision maker holds that a statement 
is credible then, according to Karanakaran such evidence (to which the decision 
maker is willing to attach some credence even though they would not say it was 
probably true) must be taken into account when considering whether a well founded 
fear of persecution has been proven to a reasonable degree of likelihood.   
This confirms that past events may be proven to a standard lower than a 
balance of probabilities, but should not suggest that proving past events can be 
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mechanically separated from the proof of prospective risk.  The same, low, standard 
of proof applies to both elements because they are part of a single question.       
This is borne out further in the Karanakaran judgment where Brooke LJ 
stated, 
[It] would be quite wrong to exclude matters totally from consideration in the 
balancing process simply because the decision-maker believes, on what may 




The point is that some statements, and indeed some events, may contribute towards 
satisfying the standard of proof even if they are not certainly true, or not even 
probably true.  Lord Brooke LJ‟s description of the Kaja determination expresses this 
in better known terms, where he noted that the tribunal was influenced by the 
„notorious‟ difficulty asylum seekers face in proving the facts of their case; 
This did not mean that there should be a more ready acceptance of fact as 
established as more likely than not to have occurred.  On the other hand, it 
created a more positive role for uncertainty.
109
 
    
Thus facts that are not „certain‟ may nevertheless enter into the balance when 
assessing whether the standard of proof has been met.  This demonstrates clearly the 
role of credible statements about unproven facts.  However since the API does not 
distinguish between the admissibility and the weight of evidence, such that the 
threshold of „credible‟ is set too close to „proven‟, then applicants are denied the 
benefit of „category (3) evidence‟ contributing to satisfying the standard of proof. 
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Indeed the API exacerbates this by wrongly stating that the Court of Appeal in 
Karanakaran considered that,  
[The] proper approach to looking at evidence of past and present events is not 
to look at these events in terms of standard of proof (so decision makers 
should not assess whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that a past 
event happened). Instead decision makers must assess whether a past or 
present event occurred, taking into account all available evidence, and come to 




Quite aside from the attempt to eschew the law on standards of proof, this passage 
reduces Brooke LJ‟s Karanakaran categories from four to two: whether the past of 
present event „occurred‟ or did not occur.  This is too absolute, requiring a firm 
decision as to whether the alleged occurrence really happened.  The double effect of 
the API‟s explanation of Karanakaran is both to preclude any benefit from the low 
standard of proof in asylum cases and to reduce the amount of evidence to be weighed 
towards meeting whatever standard of proof is applied. 
The understanding of Brooke LJ‟s use of the term „credence‟ in his third 
category of evidence dovetails with the explanation of credibility as admissibility 
given above.  Due to the evidential difficulties faced by applicants for asylum, an 
alleviating evidential rule may be applied in their favour.  The decision maker must 
then take evidence admissible under this rule into account when considering future 
risk, even if they would not go so far as to say that it is probably true.  
Unlike the API, the Karanakaran judgment also reminds decision makers that 
they should consider not only risk to the individual, but also the „seriousness of the 
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consequences if it were to eventuate‟.111  As Brooke LJ notes, the seriousness of the 
harm that might befall the applicant if their statements were true was one of the 
justifications for the low standard of proof applied to risk arrived at in 
Sivakumaran.
112
    
 
6. Conclusion 
UK asylum law and policy frequently stresses that the burden of proof is upon the 
applicant.
113





remind us, the Refugee Convention suggests that the burden is shared, and the state 
must bear some of the responsibility not only for evaluating the facts but also for 
ascertaining them. 
From one perspective, domestic RSD processes are a process of ascertaining 
evidence.  The interviews and appeals may comprise a series of attempts by the state 
to investigate and to establish the facts and merits of the case.  Out of fairness both to 
citizens of the host state and to people who do have a well founded fear of 
persecution, it is a function of the RSD process to distinguish between meritorious 
and unmeritorious applications.  Nevertheless the process of distinction must be 
lawful, humane, and objectively reasoned.
116
 
However, despite good law on the topic of credibility and proof, the foregoing 
analysis shows that recent UK policy focuses the „investigation‟ overwhelmingly 
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upon the „credibility‟ of applicant, without distinguishing the broad and narrow 
significances of that term or its relationship to notions of proof.  The consequence is 
an exaggeration of the impact of general credibility issues on the outcome of the case, 
and the application of a high but unstated standard for statements, or claims as a 
whole, to be deemed „credible‟.  
It is easy to see why „broad‟ credibility assessments might be an attractive way 
to dispose of cases.  As John Barnes, then Vice President of the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal put it, asylum adjudication involves „specialist legal knowledge in this 
arcane jurisdiction‟.117  By contrast assessing credibility in general, and plausibility in 
particular, may often be seen as an exercise in common sense.
118
  If no statements are 
credible there is no foundation for the claim, no need to grapple with the more arcane 
legal elements of refugee status determination, and no need to quantify the existence 
of a future risk.  Moreover since „credibility‟ findings are about the facts they also 
tend to be nearly immune from appeal.
119
 
Using Weston‟s three credibility tests conclusively to establish (or to deny) 
past facts underestimates the complexity of handling facts and the epistemological 
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issues raised by the choosing a means of determining them.
120
  The optimistic 
conclusion of the UK‟s API, that by following its advice decision makers „should be 
able to establish the past and present facts of a claim‟, appeals to the need of decision 
makes for simple solutions to complex evaluative problems.   
One of the most influential thinkers about the law of evidence is William 
Twining, who has observed that fact handling skills are taught less intensively to 
lawyers (where they are taught at all) than rule handling skills, mainly because legal 
education tends to focus on decisions of the higher courts in „hard‟ cases where the 
facts have been determined at first instance.
121
  One of the consequences of lawyers‟ 
lack of exposure to thinking about the nature of facts is, as Anthony Good notably 
observed, that lawyers tend to think of facts as „philosophically unproblematic‟.122  
For experts called upon to appear in the tribunals, facts are „always products of a 
particular theoretical approach, and “truth” is at best provisional and contested‟.123  
From this perspective the challenge of establishing past facts is not quite so different 




If their potential to discover „truth‟ is kept in perspective, and if their 
application is not skewed by considerations of „general credibility‟, the common tests 
of consistency and plausibility can play a very important role in domestic RSD 
                                                 
120
 This is no criticism of Weston‟s analysis, but rather a note of caution against naively converting it 
into an apparently foolproof means of establishing the facts. 
121
 W. Twining, „Taking Facts Seriously‟ reprinted in W. Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory 
Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 2
nd
 edn., 2006), 15; see also W. Twining, „Taking Facts Seriously - again‟ 
in the same volume, lamenting that the advice of the first essay, originally published in 1980, „has had 
almost no impact‟.   
122
 A. Good, „Expert Evidence in Asylum and Human Rights Appeals: an Expert‟s View‟ 16 IJRL 358-
380 (2004), 377. 
123
 ibid.  
124
 This point is discussed in greater depth in Sweeney, n. 27 above. 
Page 41 of 42 
processes.  They facilitate the identification and admissibility in evidence of 
statements that are not proven but are nevertheless credible.  The notion of credibility 
works with the benefit of the doubt to compensate for the evidential difficulties faced 
by asylum seekers, and recognizes the potentially grave consequences of incorrectly 
rejected applications. 
To the UK system, one main recommendation can be made: the current API 
on credibility should be deleted.  In spite of UNHCR‟s involvement in its drafting,125 
it is not an adequate summary of the domestic or international law on credibility.  
Instead, a revised relatively plain-English paragraph on credibility should be 
incorporated into para. 6.2 of the API on „Assessing the Asylum Claim‟, to read thus: 
 Credibility 
Decision makers must take into account unsupported statements that are 
credible (albeit unproven) when considering whether the applicant has a well 
founded fear of persecution, even if the decision maker would not go so far as 
to say that a particular statement is probably true.  An unsupported statement 
is credible if it is generally internally consistent, congruent with known facts, 
and plausible.  The applicant‟s general credibility is only relevant to the extent 
that it may assist in deciding whether a particular unsupported statement is 
credible.  Factors governing general credibility are mandated in section 8 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.    
 
This paragraph is not intended to summarise the entire process of assessing the legal 
and factual elements of an asylum claim.  It is intentionally concise on the techniques 
for establishing credibility, so as to prevent the impression that they provide an 
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infallible and technical means of discovering truth – or that refugees never lie or 
exaggerate.
126
  The reference to „general credibility‟ is included reluctantly, but since 
it is specified in primary legislation it is at present unavoidable.   
With the legal status of credibility more clearly outlined in the general API on 
„Assessing the claim‟, a separate multidisciplinary API on „Good practice in the 
determination of credibility‟, incorporating the guidelines on gender issues,127 could 
make the ample research on the psychological vulnerability of asylum applicants 
accessible to decision makers.
128
  To the extent that it is focussed specifically upon 
the legal role of credibility, the proposal here provides a clearer guide to how that 
concept can operate in the RSD process and, with the reference to the AI(ToC)A 2004 
removed, it could be used outside the UK context.    
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